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BIANNUAL SURVEY

but less than twenty days after service of the complaint. In, objecting thereto, plaintiff contended that since defendant had interposed
counterclaims he should be treated as a plaintiff for purposes of
CPLR 3132, and not receive the benefits which accrue to a defendant
under that provision. The court, in denying the objection, found
no reasonable grounds for holding contrary to the construction
given a similar provision by the federal courts. 15 4
CPLR 3019(f) provides that a cause of action contained in a
counterclaim will be treated, as far as practicable, as if it were
contained in a complaint. This would seem to support the plaintiff's
contention that defendant should be treated as a plaintiff for purposes of CPLR 3132 and appears to militate against the court's
holding. However, this would lead to the anomalous result of
both parties being required to wait twenty days before being able
to serve interrogatories without leave of court. Certainly, the
plaintiff could not logically claim that because defendant is to be
deprived of his priority, she is to be endowed with such a priority
(assuming arguendo that her original contention is correct). Consequently, when viewed in light of the foregoing, it would appear
that the court's holding is correct. To hold otherwise would be to
overcome the result which CPLR 3132 is intended to effect, viz., to
afford one of the parties a priority in serving interrogatories.
ARTICLE 32-

ACcELERATED JUDGMENT

CPLR 3213: Withdrawal of moving papers by stipulation where
action not discontinued equated to situation resulting from
service of sumnons without complaint.
Under CPLR 3213, plaintiff may serve a notice of motion for
summary judgment and supporting affidavits with a summons in
lieu of a complaint. If the motion is denied, the moving and
answering papers are deemed the complaint and answer. This
shortened procedure originated under the CPLR and, in a recent
case, a situation arose which apparently was not contemplated by
the legislature. In Reiche v. Schuster,55 the moving papers were
withdrawn by stipulation but the action itself was not formally
5
4Id. at 1014, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 416. It should be noted that the court
appears to have misstated the requirement of CPLR 3132 in stating:
"interrogatories may be served uithout leave of court by a plaintiff within
20 days of the summons and complaint and by defendant within five days
after such service upon him of the summons and complaint." (Emphasis
added.)
That provision expressly states that interrogatories may not be
served within twenty days by a plaintiff and within five days by a defendant,
after service of the summons and complaint unless leave of court is
obtained.
15547 Misc. 2d 782, 263 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Nassau County Dist. Ct.
15647 Misc. 2d 782, 263 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
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discontinued. When plaintiff subsequently brought suit in a second
court on the same cause of action, defendant moved to dismiss on
the ground of the "pendency" of the prior action. 56 The court
equated the withdrawal of the moving papers to the situation which
results after the service of a summons without a complaint, and
held that since the summary judgment motion was not denied
in
5 7
the first action, the affidavit did not become the complaint.
The main problem in the instant case was whether the stipulated withdrawal served to effectively terminate the first cause of
action. If so, the second action could proceed directly to judgment.
The court found that the summons from the first action was still
outstanding, and stayed its own action pending disposition of the
prior litigation. However, it did not decide whether an outstanding
summons was sufficient to constitute a prior pending action under
CPLR 3211(a) (4).
It has been held, for the purposes of CPLR 3211(a) (4), that
a summons alone will not bar future proceedings "as the party
might, in his declaration, count upon an entirely different cause of
action." 15s However, this reasoning may n6t be applicable to the situation presented in the instant case. Here, the court could examine the
moving papers from the first action to determine whether the two
actions were identical. If so, the court might dismiss the second
action on the basis of a prior pending action. If not, the court
would order that the second action proceed to judgment.
Pursuant to the disposition here, plaintiff can move in the
original court for a voluntary discontinuance' 59 or other clarification
of the first action's status. If it is determined that the first action
is no longer pending, plaintiff can bring that clarification to the
attention of the second court, move to vacate the latter's stay, and
proceed with the second action.
CPLR 3216: Forty-five day demand held condition precedent to
a 3216 motion.
The controversy revolving about the forty-five day notice
requirement of the 1964 amendment to CPLR 3216 appears finally
to have been resolved. In Salama v. Cohen, 60 a memorandum
156

CPLR 3211 (a) (4).

v. Schuster, 47 Misc. 2d 782, 783, 263 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (Dist
Ct. Nassau County 1965).
1'8 Louis R. Shapiro, Inc. v. Milspemes Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 857, 248
N.Y.S.2d 85, 87 (1st Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision) ; see 7B McKiNxEy's
S57Reiche

CPLR 3211, supp. commentary 96, 97 (1964).
159 CPLR 3217. It is not clear, however, if plaintiff could discontinue the
first action by mere notice to the defendant (CPLR 3217(a) (1)) or whether
he was required to obtain a court order for discontinuance (CPLR 3217(b)).
This would depend upon whether plaintiff had (by way of the since withdrawn
moving papers) asserted a claim in the first action, which question was not
resolved by the instant case.
10 154 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3, 1965, p. 16, col. 1.

